REDD+ was agreed upon in the UNFCCC as part of the Cancun Agreement 2010 which aims to ‘slow, halt, and reverse forest and carbon loss’. Currently, many aspects of REDD+ are still under negotiation, especially regarding what is meant by ‘REDD+ results’ and how these results will be funded. The long-term REDD+ incentive structure will serve as a guideline for implementing REDD+, not only in the ‘full performance phase’ but also in the ongoing ‘readiness’ process.

To ensure the reduction of deforestation and address its drivers sustainably, structural reforms are needed that encompass key aspects of governance, social, and environmental issues. Incentive structures based on a narrow definition of results that only focus on carbon are inadequate to create the necessary reforms and can lead to disproportionate allocation of resources for costly carbon measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) in the expensive readiness phase. One issue with using carbon as the sole performance or outcome determinant of REDD+ is the difficulty in proving causation, which can result in unintended windfall effects or a lack of rewards for genuine deforestation reduction efforts. Improved incentive structures that define performance criteria more broadly, monitor progress with more diverse outputs, and are based on various existing monitoring commitments and approaches can help bring about the transformative changes needed to halt forest degradation and restore it.

This brief paper offers a pragmatic approach to monitoring REDD+ performance to help protect forests more effectively amidst limited resources. The paper explains what is meant by performance broadly and how to monitor cost-effectively.

The document can be downloaded here:

REDD+ Incentive Structure for Long-Term PerformanceEmission Reduction from Deforestation and Degradation (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation/REDD+) was agreed upon in the UNFCCC as part of the Cancun Agreement 2010 which aims to ‘slow, halt, and reverse forest and carbon loss’. Currently, many aspects of REDD+ are still under negotiation, especially regarding what is meant by ‘REDD+ results’ and how these results will be funded. The long-term REDD+ incentive structure will serve as a guideline for implementing REDD+, not only in the ‘full performance phase’, but also in the ongoing ‘readiness’ process.
It has been widely agreed that to ensure the reduction of deforestation and address its drivers sustainably, structural reforms are needed that encompass key aspects of governance, social, and environmental issues. Incentive structures based on a narrow definition of results, which only focus on carbon, are inadequate to create the necessary reforms and can lead to disproportionate allocation of resources for costly carbon measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) in the expensive readiness phase. One issue with using carbon as the sole performance or outcome determinant of REDD+ is the difficulty in proving causation, which can result in unintended windfall effects or a lack of rewards for genuine deforestation reduction efforts. Improved incentive structures, which define performance criteria more broadly, monitor progress with more diverse outputs, and are based on various existing monitoring commitments and approaches, can help bring about the transformative changes needed to halt forest degradation and restore it.
This brief paper offers a pragmatic approach to monitoring reliable performance to help protect forests more effectively amidst limited resources. Grounded in published research, the paper explains what is meant by performance broadly and how to monitor cost-effectively, which can be used to underpin further discussions on this matter.