by Deni Bram, a Doctor of Climate Change Law from the University of Indonesia and an Environmental Law Lecturer at Tarumangara University

During the third session of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates’ debate held by the General Election Commission with the theme of International Politics on June 22, 2014, the issue of international environment received little attention from the presidential and vice presidential candidates. Even the National Council on Climate Change expressed disappointment as there was no in-depth discussion regarding emission issues in the Vision and Mission of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates. The timing of the debate closely coincided with the annual Climate Change Conference in Bonn, Germany from June 4, 2014, to June 15, 2014. This moment should have been optimized by the presidential and vice presidential candidates to critically evaluate and promote climate-saving strategies that the Indonesian Government can adopt in the future. The urgency of this situation increased as Indonesia had already committed itself in international documents and had binding obligations under the legal framework adopted in Presidential Regulation Number 61 of 2011 concerning the National Action Plan for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions.

At the 19th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Bonn this year, discussions on climate-saving agendas and strategies became crucial, laying the groundwork for the upcoming meeting in Lima, Peru at the end of 2014 and ultimately the final and binding decisions at COP 21 in Paris in 2015. Several strategic aspects awaited at the global level for climate-saving measures, with Indonesia’s strategic role specifically highlighted in the discussions focusing on three main points.

Firstly, the 19th annual meeting implicitly attempted to position the market regime as the sole solution in climate-saving efforts. This approach became highly transactional, especially when Indonesia engaged in the market regime without clearly establishing the legal positions and personalities of each country involved in the market regime. It was concerning when Indonesia hoped to receive funding from the market regime, while concurrently facing challenges such as high rates of deforestation and ecological corruption within its forest ecosystem. It is crucial to note that the presence of the market regime gradually shifted climate-saving issues from annex countries to non-annex countries, undermining intra-generational justice and considering carbon transactions as an ethical and acceptable practice. This trend could lead to ecological fetishism, providing opportunities for developed countries to comply with their obligations by relying on instruments within the jurisdiction of developing countries.

Secondly, another outcome of the Climate Change Conference under the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) in Bonn in mid-June 2014 breathed new life into the Kyoto Protocol, which expired in 2012. At least 11 countries ratified the extension of the Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol, effective from 2013 to 2020, including the United Arab Emirates, Barbados, Mauritius, Bangladesh, Monaco, Sudan, Federated States of Micronesia, Kenya, Honduras, China, and Norway. Despite these efforts, the Kyoto Protocol’s existence failed to meet its climate-saving targets due to various reasons, including the lack of participation and commitment from significant emitters like the United States. Moreover, the Protocol did not have a maximal impact as Annex countries formulated local and national policies that did not align with the Kyoto Protocol, making it challenging to achieve greenhouse gas reduction targets. Scientifically, this was confirmed in the publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which highlighted the hottest years occurring during the Kyoto Protocol era. The current legal framework mirrors previous international agreements, reintroducing them as long-term emission mitigation solutions until 2020. The presence of developed countries in the second commitment period seemed driven more by international negotiation interests per se, lacking tangible steps towards climate improvement.

Lastly, learning from the failures of the repressive and top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol, there is a need for a new compliance-oriented approach based on each annex country’s scientific conditions to reduce emissions, offering some hope